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A Three-fold Struggle over Neutrality:  The American Experience 
 
in the 1930s 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Stephen  C.  Neff 
 
 
 
 
 The inter-war period is perhaps the most instructive in history of neutrality, at least 
from the legal standpoint.  For one thing, the establishment of the League of Nations raised the 
most fundamental question of all:  whether neutrality could serve any purpose at all in the new 
age of collective security.  Some persons argued forcefully that it could not.  Foremost among 
them was the Greek scholar and diplomat Nicolas Politis.  Neutrality, in his opinion, may have 
been suitable for a world in which war, which was regarded in cold Realpolitik terms as an 
accepted feature of international life but was now obsolete in the new age of international 
solidarity and war prevention. 
 
[T]oday [Politis pronounced] neutrality appears to be a true 
anachronism; being no longer in harmony with the status of the law of 
nations or with the economic necessities and aspirations of the nations, 
it is, as an institution, irrevocably doomed; it is destined to disappear.1 
 
 The new trend, held Politis, was for the nations of the world to join together in the active 
pursuit of international peace.  In that grand cause, neutrality could only be seen as an 
impediment, a shirking of responsibility.  For that reason, Politis held neutrality to be “more of 
                                                 
1  Nicolas Politis, Neutrality and Peace (Francis Crane trans.; Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1935), at xiii. 
an evil than a good, because the attitude of disinterestedness happens, things being what they 
are, to favour war.”2  The way forward was clear:  neutrality must be “deliberately abandoned.”3 
 
Such was the hostility to the very idea of neutrality that James Brierly, the prominent 
professor of international law at Oxford University, strenuously objected in principle to the 
effort by the International Law Association to undertake a codification of the law of neutrality, 
contending that it was a reactionary step.4  His counterpart at Cambridge University, Arnold 
McNair, agreed, finding the idea of codifying this area of law “utterly repugnant.”5  The noted 
French lawyer Alphonse de La Pradelle was also of this view.6 
 
This principled opposition to neutrality did not go unchallenged.  Nowhere was the 
debate on the subject more vigorously conducted than in the United States – a country with a 
long and proud history of neutrality.  In both the legal academic world and the political arena, 
a vigorous contention took place between three competing visions of the future of neutrality.  
One may be termed the collective-security school.  In the spirit of Politis, this group favoured 
strengthening the collective-security machinery of the League of Nations – or alternatively 
some effective substitute for it – even if that meant substantially or entirely dispensing the with 
the law of neutrality altogether.  A second group may be called the traditional-neutrality school.  
Their primary goal was an insistence on neutrals retaining the full range of rights accorded 
them by the traditional law of neutrality, as it had evolved up to 1914 – while at the same time 
insisting that neutrals must correspondingly scrupulously adhere as well to the full range of 
duties which that law imposed on them.  Finally, there was a group sometimes known as the 
“new neutrality” school.  Their dominant purpose was, in essence, to minimise, to the greatest 
extent possible, the risk of future American involvement in such a general war. 
 
The story of the intellectual and political sparring between these three groups deserves 
to be better known than it is, if only because the competing visions are with us to the present 
day.  The following discussion is a brief survey of the stimulating, and high-stakes, debate 
which raged in the United States in the 1930s. 
                                                 
2  Id. at 42. 
3  Id. at 83. 
4  Report of the 37th Conference of the International Law Association (London:  Eastern Press, 1932), at 
175-77. 
5  Id. at 186. 
6  Id. at 187. 
  
 
The Context 
  
 
 
 It is important to appreciate how heavily the shadow of history fell upon these debates, 
in two different ways.  For one thing, the American experience with neutrality in the Great War 
was very much on the minds of all of the participants in these debates – though (as will be seen) 
with greatly differing lessons being drawn from that experience.  In addition, the three 
contending schools may be seen to match, with uncanny accuracy, a similar three-way debate 
which had taken place in the second half of the Eighteenth Century, when the law of neutrality 
began to be placed, for the first time, onto an explicit doctrinal basis in the emerging science 
of international law. 
 
 
The Eighteenth-Century debate over neutrality 
 
 
 
 The law of neutrality presents the most striking example of the manner in which a body 
of law can emerge out of practical needs and experiences, without the benefit of any underlying 
conceptual foundation.  One of the important developments was the articulation of some basic 
rules about the seizure of goods at sea in time of war, set out in the Catalan Consolato del Mare, 
dating from (probably) the Thirteenth Century, with a printed text dating from the end of the 
Fifteenth Century.  It set out what may be called a character-of-the-cargo rule to govern 
seizures.  This meant that a belligerent power could seize private property belonging to 
nationals of its enemy, regardless of where that property was found – i.e., that enemy property 
could be taken from neutral ships.  Conversely, if an enemy merchant ship was captured and 
was found to be carrying some cargo belonging to nationals of a neutral state, then that neutral 
property could not be taken.7 
 
 In the course of time – basically from the early Seventeenth Century – treaty practice 
among the major European maritime powers made an important modification of the 
Consolato’s rules.  With the notable exception of England, the powers generally agreed, by 
way of a network of bilateral treaties, that a rule of “free ships make free goods” would be 
adopted instead of a character-of-the-cargo approach.8  This meant that enemy-owned property 
would be safe from seizure if it was being carried on a neutral vessel.  (The neutral flag would 
“cover” the enemy cargo, in the common legal parlance.)  No explicit rationale was given for 
this new approach.  It was simply stated in the treaties. 
 
There were, however, two important express exceptions to this “free ships-free goods” 
rule:  contraband of war and blockades.9  If the enemy-owned goods that were being carried on 
a neutral ship consisted of materials that were to be used in the carrying on of the war (i.e., 
contraband of war), then those goods could be taken, though only by means of a judicial 
process.  The neutral ship, with its cargo, would be taken to a port of the capturing power, 
where the matter would be brought before a prize court, which would adjudicate whether the 
goods in question actually fell into the category of contraband (e.g., arms and ammunition).  If 
they did, the contraband goods would be confiscated.  (It would be “good prize” in the legal 
jargon.)  The position was much the same for cases of blockade-running by neutral ships.  If a 
neutral ships was suspected of attempting to run a blockade, then it would be brought before a 
prize court.  If the violation were held to be established, then the entire cargo would be good 
prize, along with the ship itself.  For these two key exceptions to the “free ships-free goods” 
rule, there was also no explicitly stated rationale.  There were simply the treaty provisions. 
 
It was only in the second half of the Eighteenth Century that treatise writers began to 
discuss the reasons for these rules.  Regarding the “free ships-free goods” rule, some contended 
that this should be regarded as a logical consequence of the foundational principle of state 
sovereignty.  On this argument, a neutral ship (or any ship for that matter) should be seen as a 
                                                 
7  Stanley S. Jados, The Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents (University, Alabama:  University 
of Alabama Press, 1975), sec. 276, at 191-94. 
8  Stephen C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals:  A General History (Manchester:  Manchester 
University Press, 2000), at 29-32. 
9  Id. at 32-35. 
piece of floating territory of the state whose flag it flew.  And just as one state has no legal 
right to intrude into the territory of another without consent, so no state has a legal right to 
capture a vessel flying the flag of another state without that state’s consent.10  A problem with 
this argument was that it seemed to prove too much.  It would seem to bar a belligerent state 
from capturing a neutral ship even in the cases of contraband carriage and blockade-running.  
It was over this issue that the early doctrinal debates took place. 
 
First in the field was the Swiss publicist Emmerich de Vattel, who dealt with the matter, 
albeit only very briefly, in his famous treatise on The Law of Nations of 1758 (as the Seven 
Years War was raging).11  Vattel defended the right of belligerent powers to capture contraband 
of war from neutral ships.  Furthermore, he provided an explicit rationale for that right.  The 
rationale was the principle of necessity.12  This is a general principle of international law, 
explicitly recognised in present-day international law, to the effect that a state is entitled to 
violate the legal rights of other states in order (in the present-day formulation) “to safeguard an 
essential interest” in the face of “a grave and imminent peril.”13  In the case of a state which is 
at war, the “essential interest” is, of course, achieving victory in the armed struggle, and the 
“grave and imminent peril” is the frightening prospect of defeat. 
 
This necessity theory, as it will be termed, has the neat intellectual advantage of 
conceding, in principle, the basic point that a neutral ship is equivalent to the sovereign territory 
of the neutral, while at the very same overriding, or trumping, that principle by means of a 
higher-level principle of necessity.  The neutral trader and carrier, on this view, is facing only 
the loss of profit from an arms sale, plus the inconvenience of delay in the voyage; whereas the 
belligerent captor is, virtually by definition, fighting for its very life.  The more important 
interest should prevail over the less important one. 
 
Vattel’s necessity theory was very quickly contested, however, by a Danish lawyer 
named Martin Hübner, in book entitled De la saisie des bâtiments neutres published in 1759.14  
                                                 
10  Id. at 90-91. 
11  Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law (Charles G. Fenwick trans.; 
Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Institution, 1916 [1758]). 
12  Id. at 272-78.  See also Neff, Rights and Duties of Neutrals, at 45-48. 
13  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 25, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, General Assembly Off. Rec., Supp. 10, 
56th sess., UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), at 49. 
14  Martin Hübner, De la saisie des bâtiments neutres; ou, le Droit qu’ont les nations belligérantes d’arrêter 
les navires des peoples amis (2 vols.; The Hague, 1759).  See also Neff, Rights and Duties of Neutrals, at 48-51. 
This was, incidentally, the first book devoted to neutrality issues.  Hübner conceded the right 
of belligerents to capture contraband of war from neutral ships, but on an importantly different 
line of reasoning.  He advanced what may be termed a code-of-conduct approach to the 
question.  He was concerned that a necessity-based argument, such as that of Vattel, gave too 
much leeway to belligerents at the expense of neutrals.  It gave a broad, and elastic, license to 
belligerents to take whatever action was necessary under the circumstances to prevent its war 
effort from being impeded – with neutrals simply being left with whatever was “left over.”  In 
other words, a necessity theory, by its nature, is clearly biased in favour of belligerent parties 
and against neutral ones. 
 
The true position, Hübner insisted, is that international law makes a sharp delimitation 
between the rights of belligerents on the one hand, and of neutrals on the other.  Each of these 
parties is entitled to exercise the full range of its rights, without regard to what material effect 
it might have on the other.  By the same token, there is to be no “trespassing” by either party 
into the juridical territory of the other, no matter how dire an emergency might be present.  
There can, of course, be room for argument as to precisely what the contents of this code of 
conduct are – but the basic principle, to Hübner, is that the rules (or code of conduct) are what 
they are and must be scrupulously obeyed by all parties, with no special license for emergency 
action. 
 
 It may be noted this code-of-conduct, in contrast to Vattel’s necessity theory, is not 
intrinsically biased towards either belligerents or neutrals.  Which party fares better in this 
system depends critically on what the contents of the code of conduct happen to be.  The 
contents of the code, in Hubner’s view, are customary in nature, hammered out of the raw 
material of state practice, and of the general consensus of the major maritime states, over the 
course of many years.  Crucial evidence of the contents of the code can be gleaned from the 
contents of the various bilateral treaties, but only with due care because treaty rules might 
represent departures from the underlying customary law.  But it is that underlying customary 
law which will govern all situations which are not provided for by treaty. 
 
 The third approach to the question came several years later, in 1781, from the pen of an 
Italian writer named Ferdinando Galiani.15  This was the first treatise to give a comprehensive 
treatment of the whole of the law of neutrality.  Galiani was commissioned to undertake this 
historic task by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who had a policy of firm neutrality in the various 
European wars which swirled around his small state.  It is therefore perhaps not surprising that 
Galiani produced an oeuvre which was biased in the interest of neutral states.  It may be called 
the community-interest approach to the law of neutrality because it sought to resolve contested 
questions about the law of neutrality by looking to the interest of the broader international 
community at large, rather than of the particular belligerent and neutral parties involved in a 
particular dispute.  This view was founded on the thesis that the interests of those at peace 
should, as a matter of general principle, prevail over the interests of those at war.  Consequently, 
the position should be that neutral states retain their ordinary peacetime rights in full, even 
when other states go to war.  The simple fact of being involved in a war should not confer any 
additional rights onto belligerent parties vis-à-vis neutrals. 
 
 For present purposes, it will suffice to say that, in the course of the Nineteenth Century, 
the code-of-conduct school of thought gained the upper hand over the other two.  Its definitive 
summation came at the very end of the Nineteenth Century, at the hand of the Swedish lawyer 
Richard Kleen.16  Some of its more important rules found their way into the various 
conventions drafted at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, particularly the 
conventions on Neutrality in Land War and Neutrality in Maritime War.17  Further important 
progress was made in clarifying the rules in the Declaration of London of 1909, which resolved 
a host of outstanding questions, many relating to those two longstanding and thorny subjects 
of contraband and blockade.18 
 
Notwithstanding this impressive degree of codification, this mature law of neutrality 
was something of an intellectual hodge-podge.  It was a highly detailed menu of rules which 
had evolved from centuries of state practice, but for which there was no clear guiding thread.  
                                                 
15  Ferdinando Galiani, De’ Doveri de’ Principi Neutrali verso i Principi Guerreggianti, e di Questi verso i 
Neutrali (Naples, 1782).  See also Neff, Rights and Duties of Neturals, at 51-52. 
16  See generally Richard Kleen, Lois et usages de la neutralité d’après le droit international conventionnel 
et coutumier des Etats civilises (2 vols; Paris:  A. Chevalier-Marescq, 1898-1900). 
17  Hague Convention V on the Rights and Duties of Neutrals in Land War, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 C.T…S 
299; and Hague Convention XIII on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 
C.T.S. 395. 
18  Declaration of London, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 C.T.S. 338. 
Compromise and arbitrariness held a powerful sway in effectuating a rough and ready 
balancing of the competing interests of belligerents and neutrals.  It was this corpus of law 
which was in force at the commencement of the Great War in 1914 and which accordingly 
formed the basis of various disputes about neutrality issues which arose during that conflict.19  
Debate over the lessons from that conflict formed the immediate backdrop to the disputes that 
erupted in the 1930s. 
 
 
 
American neutrality in 1914-17 and its lessons 
 
 
 
 A shadow which loomed very large over the neutrality debates of the 1930s was the 
experience of the United States as a neutral during the Great War, in the period 1914-17.  Prior 
to that, the United States had a long and proud history as a neutral power, and consequently as 
a resolute champion of the rights of neutrals generally.  It even had the distinction of having 
gone to war in 1812 against a major European power in order to uphold its rights as a neutral 
during the French Revolutionary struggles of the time.  History repeated itself, at least in a 
manner of speaking.  When the United States entered the global fray in 1917, it was in direct 
response to the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, i.e., the policy of sinking 
neutral ships as well as enemy ones if they were found to be trading with the Allied powers.20 
 
In the aftermath of the conflict, critical voices began to emerge.21  Involvement in the 
war was increasingly seen as having been an error on the country’s part.  But there was 
disagreement over what the fault had been.  Some were inclined to blame special interests, 
whose selfish and greedy actions had dragged the country into war.  In particular, suspicions 
were voiced against two groups:  arms exporters and financiers.  In a less conspiratorial vein, 
some alleged that the American insistence on the rigorous upholding of its rights as a neutral 
was at fault, and that a decision to go to war should be have been made (or decided against, as 
                                                 
19  See Neff, Rights and Duties of Neutrals, at 145-65. 
20  See generally Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation 1914-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.:  
Harvard University Press, 1959). 
21  For a general account of these debates, see generally Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists:  
The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
the case may be) on the basis of broader questions of the country’s over-all national interest, 
instead of on the basis of arcane legal quibbles.  Adherents of this view became supporters of 
what would be called the “new neutrality” thesis of the 1930s. 
 
Some read the opposite lesson from the experience of 1914-17.  These were persons 
who insisted that the problem was not that the United States had been too stubborn in its 
defence of its neutral rights, but rather that the its policy had not been truly neutral at all.  It 
had been, in reality, squarely directed in favour of the Allied side and against Germany.  In 
particular, the United States cravenly acquiesced in British economic-warfare measures while 
at the same time taking very strict positions against any German infringements of its neutral 
rights.  In addition, American lending, undertaken on a massive scale, had gone virtually 
entirely to the Allied side.22  It was therefore hardly surprising that Germany decided to take 
the actions which brought the United States formally into the conflict.  “We were unneutral 
and we paid the cost,” was the crisp summation of one of the leading figures of this viewpoint, 
Edwin M. Borchard of Yale Law School.23  Adherents of this view became the proponents of 
what will be termed the traditional-neutrality school of thought. 
 
 These debates from the Eighteenth Century and the post-1918 period formed the 
backdrop to the disputes that divided international lawyers in the United States during the 
1930s. 
 
 
 
 
The Three Rival Neutralities – The Old, the “New” and the Obsolete 
 
 
 
 
 As the danger of a second world war became ever more menacing, it is natural that 
American minds became increasingly concerned over what the country’s neutrality policy 
                                                 
22  See Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage, Neutrality for the United States (London:  Oxford 
University Press, 1937), at 33-44. 
23  Id. at 34. 
should be in the event of another general European war.  It was generally envisaged that the 
United States would not actually enter such a conflict.  But there the agreement stopped, and 
the three competing camps formed:  the collective-security group, the “new neutrality” 
partisans and the champions of traditional neutrality. 
 
 
 
The collective-security school 
 
 
 
 At the core of the collective-security position was the view that neutrality could still 
survive in the modern world, in the sense that states would still be able to refrain from 
participating in wars which broke out.  But neutrality should no longer be governed, as in the 
past, by a strict principle of impartiality.  Instead, it should be integrated with the concept of 
good global citizenship. 
 
 In the United States, the view was expressed famously by Henry Stimson, who served 
as secretary of state in the Hoover administration.24  He was converted to the collective-security 
cause by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and became an active spokesman for 
it after leaving office in 1933.  Where the legal approach to war had once been a matter of strict 
impartiality and legal equality between the contending parties – coupled with scrupulous non-
involvement and impartiality on the part of neutrals – Stimson insisted that that this could no 
longer be so. 
 
Hereafter when two nations engage in armed conflict either one or both 
of them must be wrongdoers. . . .  We no longer draw a circle about 
them and treat them with the puntilios of the duelist’s code.  Instead we 
denounce them as lawbreakers.25 
 
 
                                                 
24  See, for example, Henry L. Stimson, “Neutrality and War Prevention,” 312 Int’l Conciliation 347-57 
(1935). 
25  Quoted in Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality:  Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Struggle over 
the Arms Embargo (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1962), at 19. 
Among academic international lawyers, the foremost American champion of this approach was 
Quincy Wright, of the University of Chicago.  Other proponents of this general way of thinking 
included Manley Hudson of Harvard Law School, Clyde Eagleton of New York University 
Law School, Charles G. Fenwick of Bryn Mawr College, James Shotwell of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia 
University and Nobel Peace Prize winner, and Newton Baker, a former secretary of war and 
Wilsonian internationalist. 
 
  Like Politis, Wright contended that traditional neutrality was only a meaningful 
concept in conflicts in which the belligerents were legal equals.  But we no longer live in such 
a world.  Now, war which occurs anywhere in the world is the concern of the world at large – 
as expressly stated in the Covenant of the League of Nations.26  Traditional neutrality, in 
Wright’s view, amounted to a shirking of the duties of global good citizenship – and even to 
the actual encouragement of aggression, since neutrality precluded the providing of assistance 
to victim countries.  
 
Far from discouraging war [Wright asserted], neutrality . . . has tended 
to encourage aggression of the strong against the weak.  Far from 
assisting states to keep out of war, neutral rights have themselves 
provided the basis for disputes which have drawn non-participants into 
war.27 
 
The single most conspicuous plank of the collective-security programme was the idea 
that neutral states should be allowed – or even required – to show partiality against aggressor 
states and in favour of victims of aggression.  Politis candidly maintained that neutral states 
“could . . . depart from the duty of impartiality” in the interest of promoting the international 
community’s broader goal of peace and security.28  He contended that an aggressor belligerent 
could have no right to complain of unneutral acts which benefitted its victim – and conversely, 
that neutral states could have to right to complain if their traditional neutral rights were 
infringed by the victim state and its supporters.29 
 
                                                 
26  League of Nations Covenant, art. 11. 
27  Quincy Wright, “The Present Status of Neutrality,” 34 Am. J. Int’l L. 391-415 (1940), at 409. 
28  Politis, Neutrality and Peace, at 47. 
29  Id. at 47-50. 
 Further ammunition for the collective-security advocates was provided by the adoption 
of the Pact of Paris (or Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928, in which states parties (including the 
United States) foreswore resort to war as “an instrument of national policy.”30  Although the 
Pact contained no explicit enforcement provisions, the thesis was advanced that any state 
breaching the Pact would thereby be committing a violation of international law, with the 
consequence, as a matter of general international law, that other parties to the agreement 
thereby became automatically entitled to institute sanctions (or countermeasures in present-day 
parlance) against it.  These sanctions could take the form of the adoption of preferential policies 
in favour of a state that was a victim of the violation.  In 1934, the Institute of International 
Law explicitly endorsed this position.31 
 
In this same general vein, a research programme in the 1930s based at Harvard Law 
School produced, in 1939, a draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Case of 
Aggression.32  This was drawn up under the auspices of Philip C. Jessup of Columbia Law 
School.  It pointedly refrained from even using the word “neutral,” but nonetheless provided, 
in essence, that non-belligerent states would be entitled, vis-à-vis an aggressor state, to all of 
the rights of a neutral but would be relieved from all of the duties of neutrality.  Aggressor 
states would therefore have no right to enforce blockades against neutral states, or to capture 
and confiscate contraband war being carried to their enemies. 
 
 
 
The “new neutrality” emerges 
 
 
 
 Opposition to traditional neutrality was not a monopoly of the collective-security 
advocates.  A rival reform programme was offered by the proponents of what was sometimes 
                                                 
30  Pact of Paris, Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
31  Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris (August 27, 1928):  Articles of Interpretation as Adopted by the Budapest 
Conference, 1934 (London:  Sweet and Maxwell, 1934).  See also Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Pact of Paris and 
the Budapest Articles of Interpretation,” 20 Transactions of the  Grotius Society 178–206 (1935). 
32  Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 (Supp.) Am. J. Int’l L. 
827-30 (1939), with commentary at 844-909. 
called the “new neutrality.”  Its leading champion was a professor at Harvard Law School 
named Charles Warren. 
 
Warren’s “new neutrality” stance was unveiled at the 1933 annual meeting of the 
American Society of International Law33 and then expounded in fuller form the following year 
in an article in Foreign Affairs.34  The “new neutrality” position may be characterised, in broad 
terms, as a programme for ensuring that a neutral state was not pulled into a war against its 
own national interest.  The primary means for ensuring this would be to refrain from insisting 
on the enforcement of its full range of traditional neutral rights.  A neutral state’s foremost 
interest lay in making sure that it stayed out of war.  And if some – or even most or all – of the 
traditional neutral rights had to be sacrificed to ensure this, then that was a price that, 
realistically, would have to be paid. 
 
 A key consideration underlying the “new neutrality” position was the belief that, in 
reality, impartiality – that cornerstone principle of traditional neutrality -- was an impossible 
goal.  Even policies that were even-handed on their face would virtually never be so in their 
material effects, because one side would inevitably benefit from the policy more than the other.  
For example, during the Great War, belligerent warships of both sides had been allowed to 
enter American ports – but the policy, in practice, exclusively benefitted the Allies because 
German ships were bottled up in Europe by Allied blockades.  By the same token, assertions 
of neutral rights would, in reality, affect the belligerents unequally.  The point was pithily made 
by the prominent journalist and commentator Walter Lippmann: 
 
To assert the freedom of the seas . . . is to take sides against the nation 
which has sea power; not to assert the freedom of the seas is to take 
sides with the national which has sea power.  In either event neutrality 
in any effective sense of the term has vanished.35 
 
 The more sensible policy, in Warren’s opinion, is for a neutral state to reduce all 
contacts with all belligerents to the greatest extent feasible.  The single most important step in 
this direction would be a prohibition against arms sales to any belligerents once a war broke 
                                                 
33  Charles Warren, “What Are the Rights of Neutrals Now, in Practice?” 27 Procs. Am. Soc. Int’l L. 128-
34 (1933). 
34  Charles Warren, “Troubles of a Neutral,” 12 Foreign Affairs 377-94 (1934).  See also Charles Warren, 
“Prepare for Neutrality,” 24 Yale Rev. 467-78 (1935). 
35  Walter Lippmann, “Mr Walter Lippmann’s Proposals,” 17 Naval Rev. 274-80 (1929), at 275. 
out.  Warren also proposed that American nationals should be barred from travelling on ships 
that carried arms.  The reason was that such ships were subject to being sunk (as the Lusitania 
had been) – and an outcry over the deaths of American nationals might be a force propelling 
the country towards entry into the war.  The United States, in Warren’s view, should also bar 
armed vessels of all belligerents from entering its ports.  In addition, he favoured prohibiting 
the public flotation of loans to belligerents in the United States.  He conceded, though, that 
private loan arrangements should be allowed to continue, as barring those would be involve 
too great an economic sacrifice for the American economy.36 
 
 A key feature of the “new neutrality” position was an intense opposition to war 
profiteering on the part of neutrals.  In Warren’s view, neutral states should be permitted, during 
war, to continue their normal pre-war pattern and level of trade with either or both belligerents, 
but not to increase it.  “It is better,” asserted Warren, “that our citizens should run the risk of 
commercial loss than that the country should be involved in a war to protect their alleged 
commercial rights.”37  If the country, or the government, was actually concerned over economic 
loss caused by the foregoing of traditional legal rights, then the rational policy would be for 
the government itself (i.e., the country at large) to provide that compensation, rather than for 
the United States to plunge into war. 
 
The “new neutrality” position won support from a number of prominent international 
lawyers.  Among them was Herbert Briggs of Columbia Law School.38  Another supporter was 
James Wilford Garner of the University of Illinois.39  It also had the support of the prominent 
historian Charles Beard, who derided historic neutral rights as “a mere fiction,” and their 
defence in war-time as “a warlike measure.”40  The most prominent recruit was James Brown 
Scott, the long-serving editor of the American Journal of International Law and leading light 
in the American Society of International Law.41  Scott had also chaired the Neutrality Board of 
the Department of State during the Great War. 
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The traditional neutrality school 
 
 
 
Ranged against both of these sets of plans for the modification of the law of neutrality 
were those who insisted on the retention, and vigorous defence, of that law as it had evolved to 
the eve of the Great War.  The foremost spokesmen for this group were John Bassett Moore 
and Edwin Borchard.  Moore had been a prominent professor of international law at Columbia 
Law School, and then a judge of the newly established World Court.  Borchard was a former 
student and protégé of Moore.  Another prominent figure in this camp was Lester H. Woolsey 
of American University (who was also a prominent practitioner in international law).42  Moore 
and Borchard were both harsh critics of the American neutrality policies of 1914-17, protesting 
that the United States had not been, in reality, truly neutral in the Great War.  Rather, its policies 
had been heavily biased towards the Allied side – with the Germans thereby being, in essence, 
provoked into the drastic step of unrestricted submarine warfare.   
 
Borchard was fully aware of the historically contingent character of the substantive law 
of neutralit, of which he was so staunch a defender, candidly describing it as “a fairly definite 
compromise between the . . . conflicting and irreconcilable claims of the belligerent to stop all 
trade with his enemies, and of the neutral to continue freely to trade with both belligerents.”  
This compromise, he conceded, was “founded not on logic but on agreement.”43  But that was 
not seen as a weakness of the law.  On the contrary, the very fact that the traditional law of 
neutrality was rooted in agreement, rather than in some kind of hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning from first principles, meant that states are not free to overthrow it at will.  The law 
of neutrality may be essentially contractual in nature.  But contracts are legally binding.  They 
can, of course, be altered by later agreement among the parties; but until that happens, the law 
stands as agreed. 
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Moore and Borchard insisted that scrupulous adherence to the law of neutrality was the 
best guarantee of peace – at least for the neutral state itself.  Moore contended that neutrality 
“has always had . . . the highly moral and expedient object of preventing the spread of war.”44  
In the same vein, Borchard lauded traditional neutrality as being humanitarian and peace-
preserving because it served to limit the impact of war on third states and to enable peaceful 
states to carry on their lives with a minimum of disruption.  For this reason, neutrality should 
be recognised as “one of the beneficent achievements of a long struggle with barbarism.”45  
 
 
 
The Schools in Contention 
 
 
 
During the 1930s, contention raged between the partisans of these three rival schools 
of thought – first in the pages of scholarly journals and the conference rooms of the American 
Society of International Law, and then in the halls of the United States Congress.  Before 
looking at these battles, though, it is useful to note that the three were clear and direct 
descendants of the three contending viewpoints that had emerged (as noted above) in the late 
Eighteenth Century. 
 
 
The past as present 
 
 
The “new neutrality” of Warren and his followers was clearly the direct descendant of 
Vattel’s necessity thesis.  It was noted above that that thesis, in effect, gave priority to the 
interests of belligerents over those of neutrals, with the so-called “rights” of neutrals being, in 
reality, merely the residue that was left after the belligerents had taken the measures that were 
necessary to further their war efforts.  Warren was of the same view, expressly deriding 
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neutrality rights as “a legal fiction.”46  He frankly contended that what were commonly labelled 
as neutral rights were in reality merely “a concession, express or implied, on the part of the 
belligerent that if the neutral’s acts did not impair too seriously the belligerent’s chances of 
winning the war, the neutral would be allowed to do ‘business as usual.’”47  Belief in rights of 
neutrals, Warren insisted, was not merely misguided intellectually; it was downright dangerous 
as a basis for policy-making. 
 
[T]he sane policy for us [contended Warren] would be . . . to admit 
frankly that, whether or not ‘rights’ exist in law, it is impracticable to 
assert them successfully during the war, and that it is impracticable to 
wrest admission of them from a belligerent. . . .  There is too much talk 
in international affairs about rights and too little about adjustments.  
Harping on rights leads to arrived-at position from which a nation 
cannot withdraw or yield; it leads to ultimatums which inevitably lead 
to war.48 
 
Instead of asserting its supposed rights, neutrals should instead realistically size up their 
situation in each conflict as it occurs and negotiate with the belligerents over what sort of 
conduct will be allowed and what will not.  The outcome of such negotiations will, inevitably, 
depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties in the particular circumstances rather 
than on some pre-existing, objective menu of rights and duties. 
 
Just as obviously, the collective-security standpoint was the modern-day version of 
Galiani’s community-interest approach.  The only difference was that, in the inter-war period, 
there was an actual international institution designed to represent the interest of the 
international community at large – the League of Nations.  But, as noted above, the collective-
security approach did not actually depend on the existence or effectiveness of the League itself.  
The proposed Convention for the Assistance of Victims of Aggression, for example, was 
designed to operate outside the League framework.  In all events, though, the essence of the 
collective-security, or community-interest, position remained the same now as it had in the age 
of Galiani:  that the welfare of the broader international community at large should prevail over 
the parochial rights and duties of both belligerent and neutral states. 
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Finally, it is most apparent of all that the traditional neutrality stance of Moore and 
Borchard and their followers was an explicit continuation of the code-of-conduct approach to 
neutrality.  As such, it was the most legalistic of the three, in the everyday sense of that word.  
It held that, so long as the rules of the law of neutrality were scrupulously adhered to, in all of 
their detailed sinuosity, belligerents could have no ground for complaint, and neutrals need 
have no fear of being pulled into a conflict against their will.  In this spirit, Borchard spoke out 
in favour of proposals for a full and systematic codification of the law of neutrality, to assist in 
the resolution of any future disputes that might arise in the area.49 
 
One feature shared by all three groups was the importance of learning the lessons from 
the difficult experience of 1914-17.  They disagreed, however, on what those lessons actually 
were.  To the collective-security group, the lesson was that it was important to take the utmost 
care to ensure that an experience like that the Great War would not recur.  To that end, would-
be aggressor states should not be allowed to be confident that neutral powers would carefully 
treat them on a par with their victims.  They should be on notice that even states not actually 
participating in the hostilities would adopt policies favourable to their foes.  To the “new 
neutrality” proponents, the lesson was learned was the impossibility of adopting policies whose 
material effects would be truly even-handed – and, by extension, the illusory nature of the very 
idea of rights of neutrals.  Such so-called rights, when asserted, always favoured one belligerent 
and correspondingly provoked hostility from the other.  Therefore, the sensible policy was to 
withdraw from contact with the belligerents as much as possible.  To the traditional-neutrality 
advocates, the lesson from 1914-17 was the importance of scrupulous and conscientious 
adherence to the established law of neutrality, and particularly to the core principle of the duty 
of impartiality.  Provided that that was done, no belligerent could have any right to be aggrieved 
– and hence could have no legal ground for taking action and forcing the neutral into the 
conflict. 
 
 
 
The debate rages 
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  There has seldom, if ever, been so vigorous and lively debate among American 
international lawyers as occurred in the 1930s over the direction which the law of neutrality 
should take.  The spokesmen for the three rival groups were talented polemicists who, in 
commenting on momentous issues of war and peace, did not hesitate to attack their opponents 
with gusto.  At the same time, though, it will be noted that on certain issues, there was some 
room for accommodation of views, if only begrudgingly, between the contending factions.   
 
The first major salvo came in 1933, with a broadside attack by Moore, in an article in 
Foreign Affairs, against the very concept of collective security.50  Ideas of collective security, 
he grumbled, “have no visible moorings on earth or in the sky.”51  Such notions appeal only to 
“shallow dupes who . . . urge that we blindly don an imported livery of ‘world service’” in 
order gallantly to purge the world of wickedness.  The true, if unsettling, view is that war is an 
inevitable and unavoidable feature of international affairs.  Therefore, the sensible policy is 
simply to decide, as each conflict arises, whether to join in or stay out.  If the decision is made 
to stay out, then the ready-made code of neutrality law is right there to guide all parties.  
Collective-security ideas – or delusions – are moralistic, utopian schemes that should play no 
role in the hardheaded business of international law and relations. 
 
Regarding the law of neutrality specifically, Moore asserted that claims of its 
obsolescence were “unsound in theory and false in fact,” holding that state practice continued 
to recognise the validity of the traditional law.52  Assertions that the law of neutrality no longer 
existed were, Moore contended, merely part and parcel of a broader campaign to align 
American foreign policy with the actions of the League of Nations. 
 
 Borchard was of the same persuasion.  He too objected to the moralistic outlook of the 
collective-security advocates.  War, he insisted, should not be seen in terms of right and wrong.  
Rather, it should be seen as a disease.  And the best way of dealing with a disease is to prevent 
it from spreading.  That is precisely the valuable role that traditional neutrality played, and 
should continue to play.  Collective security was, in his opinion, mere “doctrinaire . . . political 
                                                 
50  Moore, “Appeal to Reason.” 
51  Id. at 551. 
52  John Bassett Moore, “The New Isolation,” 27 Am. J. Int’l L. 607-27 (1933), at 620. 
theology.”53  The idea of common action against aggressors was derided by Borchard as “a 
kind of emotional morality which enables indignation and violence to clothe themselves in the 
mantle of righteousness.”54  Far from looking towards the isolation or containment of war, 
collective-security policies sought to involve as much of the world as possible in every conflict.  
“It seems impolitic,” warned Borchard, “to suggest or imply that wars will be sooner ended by 
converting local conflicts into wide and general wars.”55  He dismissed the Harvard Research’s 
draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression as “an evangelical 
expression of moral convictions” which was “non-legal in its connotations.”56  In short, insisted 
Borchard, “[t]he philosophy of minding your own business has not yet been improved upon as 
a way to peace, sanity and tolerable life.”57 
 
 Two points about the traditional-neutrality advocates are worth noting.  One is that their 
primary target was the collective-security school.  Their opposition to the “new neutrality” 
group was not so fundamental.  It was more of a difference about policy.  So long as the “new 
neutrality” programme envisaged even-handed treatment of belligerents in war – as it did – it 
was not so deeply contrary to the received law of neutrality as the collective-security approach 
was.  Abandonment of neutral rights was seen, to be sure, as a most unwise policy.  But so long 
as it was done voluntarily by the neutral state itself, as proposed by Warren and his followers, 
it would not actually be an outright violation of neutrality, in the way that collective-security 
policies were. 
 
The second point about the traditional-neutrality school is that it may be tempting to 
label it as “isolationist.”  This would, however, be justifiable only if one defines “isolationist” 
as meaning opposition to collective security.  It should be appreciated that the traditional-
neutrality advocates did not advocate isolationism in the sense of believing that the United 
States should cut itself off from the larger world.  On the contrary, the traditional-neutrality 
people insisted on full American involvement with the world at large – merely maintaining that 
the rules of that involvement should be the traditional rules of international law as inherited 
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from past centuries rather than some new-fangled and visionary rules which had never stood 
the test of time. 
 
The label of “isolationist” could be applied with much greater justice to those in the 
“new neutrality” camp because they actually did favour, to a significant extent, a policy of 
withdrawal of the United States from world affairs in the event of a general war.  More than 
the other two schools, it was an anti-war programme, designed to keep the United States safe 
– and isolated – in the face of war by foreign powers.  The “new neutrality” was, accordingly, 
the most egoistic of the three contending groups. 
 
For this very reason, the “new neutrality” drew the especially strong hostility of the 
collective-security advocates.  Wright derided it as “storm-cellar neutrality.”58  Eagleton 
regarded it as the worst of the three contending alternatives, condemning it as a programme of 
“supine submission” to the wishes of belligerents, even if they are flagrant aggressors.  As 
such, it amounts to a formula for “craven submission to the criminal.”  He saw it as a 
contemptible proposal “that we shut ourselves up within our own gates and pocket our losses 
and our pride.”59  In this attack, the traditional-neutrality advocates could – and did – readily 
join.  Moore scornfully likened the “new neutrality” programme to a turtle retiring into its shell, 
denouncing it as “a gopher-like policy of seclusion.”60 
 
In certain other respects, though, the “new neutrality” and collective-security supporters 
could find common ground.  The principal manifestation of this was a shared moralistic 
outlook.  Both were receptive to the idea that traditional neutrality had a worryingly close 
relationship to war profiteering.  By trading in contraband of war, neutrals could fatten their 
bank balances while feeding, and even prolonging, the conflict.  From the collective-security 
perspective, this amounted to flagrant bad world citizenship, to deliberate and cold-hearted 
abdication of the overriding duty of states to cooperate with one another to reduce armed 
conflict and to defeat aggression when it occurred.  From the “new neutrality” standpoint, 
stubborn insistence on the right to continue trading with belligerents during war, under grand 
claims of legal right, were a formula for luring the neutral power into the struggle once those 
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so-called “rights” came under threat – and thereby forcing the neutral country as a whole into 
war for the benefit of a clique of greedy profiteers. 
 
Similarly, it is readily seen that the traditional neutrality supporters and the “new 
neutrality” group could find much in common in a mutual hostility to the collective-security 
group.  They were critical of the collective-security programme of involving (ideally) all states 
of the world in a continuing operation of global policing.  This idea was seen as a utopian one 
without any proven track record of success.  On the contrary, the collective-security ideal had 
failed spectacularly to prevent Japan from occupying Manchuria in 1931; and in 1935-36, it 
would fail even more spectacularly when Italy invaded and conquered Abyssinia.  The 
traditional neutrality and the “new neutrality” advocates both agreed that the better solution 
was the isolation and containment of conflict. 
 
 
 
Neutrality law-making 
 
 
 
 Insofar as any of the three rival schools could claim victory in policy-making circles in 
the 1930s, it was the “new neutrality” group.  It is not difficult to see why this was so.  It held 
out a seductive promise of a practical and realistic way of ensuring that the United States would 
not be drawn into a future general war.  In the atmosphere of the 1930s, there was a widespread 
feeling that participation in the First World War had been a mistake, and that consequently the 
utmost care should be taken to avoid re-making that mistake in a future conflict.  Collective 
security held out the worrying prospect that the country would be drawn into some kind of 
never-ending global campaign against aggressors (or supposed aggressors) in faraway lands 
where no American national interest was really at stake.  Traditional neutrality carried the risk 
that, in vindicating breaches of legal rights, the country would be forced into war without the 
sort of broad consideration of over-all national interest that many held to be so essential. 
 
 The American political process being as it is, it is hardly surprising that the “new 
neutrality” programme came about not at a single grand, coherent stroke, but rather in a 
somewhat halting and piecemeal manner.  An early indication of it was the enactment of the 
Johnson Act in 1934 (named for its chief sponsor, Senator Hiram Johnson of California).61  
This law prohibited Americans from lending to any European countries which were in default 
in the repayment of outstanding loans, chiefly of course being loans made during the Great 
War.  Since virtually all of the borrowers were in default, the law effectively barred American 
lending to European states altogether – and, importantly, served notice that, in the event of 
another European war, the United States would not be a source of financing for it, as had been 
the case in the previous conflict. 
 
 The single most prominent issue in the neutrality debates was the question of arms 
trading and the imposition of embargoes on that trading in the event of wars between other 
countries.  On this key issue, the three camps divided with great precision.  The “new 
neutrality” advocates favoured impartial arms embargoing, so that arms would stop flowing 
from the United States equally to both sides in the event war. The collective-security group 
was in favour of partial embargoes – i.e., of prohibiting the supply of arms to aggressor states, 
while permitting arms flows to victim countries to continue. Finally, the traditional-neutrality 
group opposed arms embargoes altogether, as a craven surrender of the rights of neutrals. 
 
It should be noted, though, that, for both the traditional-neutrality group and the 
collective-security advocates, an impartial embargo figured as a second choice.  For the 
collective-security group, if a discriminatory embargo was not possible, then an impartial 
embargo affecting both sides could be accepted, as it at least had the virtue of preventing the 
United States from prolonging the conflict by becoming an arms supplier to one side, or even 
to both.  The worst choice, from this standpoint, was the laissez-faire one of allowing arms 
trading without limit.  From the traditional-neutrality standpoint, if such a laissez-faire policy 
was not feasible, then an impartial embargo would be the next choice, because at least that 
would retain adherence to the key principle of impartiality.  The worst of choices, from this 
standpoint, would be a discriminatory embargo, which would violate the cardinal neutral duty 
of impartiality and thereby constitute, in Borchard’s words, “an unfriendly and hostile act of 
the greatest significance,” tantamount to a declaration of war against the disfavoured state.62 
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 So the concrete issue presenting itself in the 1930s in the United States was:  what kind 
of embargo power, if any at all, should the Congress grant to the President?  For advice on this 
question, the Department of State sought the advice of Warren.  In August 1934, Warren duly 
produced a lengthy memorandum advocating a “new neutrality” approach to the matter.  Its 
centrepiece was a recommendation that an impartial arms embargo be instituted when war 
broke out.  President Franklin Roosevelt expressed strong interest, and the Department of State 
proceeded to draft legislation in accord with Warren’s plan.63  But opposition simmered within 
the Roosevelt administration.  The Navy was strongly in favour of upholding traditional neutral 
rights.  From the collective-security vantage-point came strong opposition from Norman Davis, 
a longstanding Wilsonian internationalist who later served as the American ambassador to the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference.  Davis favoured a presidential power to impose partial 
embargoes, which would enable the United States to coordinate its policies with those of the 
League.64 
 
 In the Congress, however, the prevailing sentiment was in favour of a non-
discriminatory embargo policy.  That this was so was hardly surprising, given the fact, noted 
above, that a non-discriminatory embargo was the first choice of one of the factions (the “new 
neutrality” group) but also the second choice of both of the others.  So, as a kind of least 
common denominator, the odds were somewhat stacked in its favour.  Accordingly, the 
Neutrality Act of 1935 provided that, in the event of war, the president was required to impose 
a mandatory arms embargo against both sides.  In addition, the president was given 
discretionary power to proclaim that American nationals who travelled on belligerent-flag 
vessels could only do so at their own risk.65  That this foray into the territory of the “new 
neutrality” was only tentative is indicated by the fact that the law was of temporary duration, 
expiring in February 1936.66  The chief impact of the new policy was on the conflict between 
Italy and Abyssinia.  As luck, in combination with geopolitics, would have it, the impartial 
embargo that was imposed harmed Italy more than Abyssinia, since only Italy could 
realistically have imported arms from the United States in any event. 
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 A Neutrality Act of 1936 was then enacted to replace the earlier one on its expiration.  
Now, however, the focus of debate had shifted to the question of exports other than armaments, 
with raw materials as the principal concern.  On this issue, there was the same clear division 
among the three competing approaches.  The “new neutrality” group, including Warren, Walter 
Lippmann and Walter Millis, favoured a grant to the president of the power to impose an 
impartial embargo on any and all exports.  Traditional-neutrality supporters, chiefly Borchard, 
Moore and Senator Johnson, opposed such a power, as did representatives from states with 
substantial exports.  On this point, the traditional-neutrality approach prevailed, although the 
mandatory arms embargo was re-enacted, along with the travel-restriction authority.67  The 
result, therefore, was essentially simply a continuance of the 1935 law.  It too had a built-in 
expiry date (of April 1937). 
 
 The next Neutrality Act, of 1937, contained a new element, popularly known as “cash 
and carry,” which was a substitute for an embargo on non-contraband exports.  Such exports 
would not be flatly prohibited.  Instead, the president was empowered to designate a list of 
goods for which the belligerents would have to pay cash (i.e., loans from Americans would not 
be allowed), and which the belligerents would have to transport in their own vessels.  The idea, 
then, was that the United States would function only as a sort of passive dispensary of raw 
materials, but could not actually facilitate either their purchase or their transport.  The practical 
effect of the plan, it was envisaged, would be, de facto, to reduce the flow of materials to 
belligerents by virtue of the difficulty that the belligerents would have in coming up with the 
necessary cash and shipping capacity – but without imposing a de jure prohibition.  This policy 
too was a tentative one, programmed to expire in May 1939. 
 
This cash-and-carry plan offered some modest satisfaction to both the “new neutrality” 
and the traditional-neutrality groups – while at the same time being deficient as well in the eyes 
of both.  (To the collective-security advocates, it had no virtues.)  It was at least a gesture in 
the direction of the “new neutrality,” since it was carefully designed to avoid placing the United 
States in the position of asserting neutral rights against belligerents.  But it stopped short of 
being a complete embargo.  To the traditional-neutrality partisans, it had the virtue of being 
even-handed on its face – but also the vice of being a surrender of the traditional right to carry 
goods to belligerents. 
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 The cash-and-carry policy was bedevilled, however, by the consideration that virtually 
any neutral policy, even if even-handed on its face, would, in practice, impact upon the 
belligerents in differing ways.  James Wilford Garner warned that cash-and-carry would 
“operate in practice with the grossest inequality as between the opposing belligerents.”68  In 
particular, it would operate in favour of a belligerent which possessed substantial wealth of its 
own, plus a merchant marine, to the detriment of a poorer or landlocked states or a state without 
a substantial fishing fleet.  More specifically, at the very time of enactment, the cash-and-carry 
policy would operate in favour of Japan and against China in the war which had just broken 
out in the Far East.  In a European war, however, it would be a different story.  Because of 
British domination of the seas and its general mercantile strength, it would be well placed to 
benefit from a cash-and-carry policy, at the expense of Germany. 
 
 Much the same could be said of an automatic and impartial arms embargo.  It appears, 
on its face, to be an entirely even-handed policy.  But in practice, that would not be so.  A 
wealthy state which was planning an aggressive attack would carefully stockpile arms imported 
prior to the war – possessing the key advantage of controlling when the embargo would take 
effect.  Once the war was in train, it would be too late for the victim country to follow suit.  On 
this same reasoning, an apparently even-handed arms embargo would, in reality, work in favour 
of a belligerent which possessed a substantial domestic arms industry and against a state which 
did not. 
 
 The Roosevelt administration took some steps to mitigate these effects.  Regarding the 
war in the Far East – and fully aware that a cash-and-carry policy would favour Japan over 
China – President Roosevelt took the remarkable step, or rather non-step, of pointedly declining 
to proclaim the existence of a war.  Consequently, the cash-and-carry policy was not applied.  
This step (or non-step) was actually heartening from the standpoint of the collective-security 
supporters, who were particularly aghast that the United States might adopt a policy that 
blatantly favoured an aggressor over a victim.  But it gives rise to doubts as to what the United 
States’s neutrality policy actually was.69 
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Collective security in action 
 
 
 
 When the Second World War actually broke out in 1939, the result was a sharp change 
in the neutrality policy of the United States, in the direction of the collective-security position.  
Since the conflict had been inaugurated by one of history’s clearest instances of aggression, 
there was no real pretence that that the United States was actually neutral in the contest, in the 
traditional sense of being truly indifferent as to the outcome.  Instead, it was “non-belligerent.”  
Cooperation with the Allied side was the order of the day virtually from the outset.  An early 
sign was the altering of the neutrality legislation, in November 1939, to discard the mandatory 
arms embargo.  It was replaced not with a discriminatory arms embargo, as the collective-
security proponents would have preferred, but instead with a rough and ready substitute:   a 
cash-and-carry policy.70  As noted above, a cash-and-carry policy operated in practice – and 
was fully intended to operate – in favour of France and Britain, to the detriment of Germany.  
As such, it was clearly directed against the aggressor state in the war. 
 
 There were great misgivings as to both the wisdom and legality of taking that step, 
during the hostilities, on the ground that it would obvious to all that the purpose was to enable 
the United States to assist the Allies.  Interestingly, Jessup opposed the change.71  His 
collective-security mindset envisaged establishing an essentially permanent and fixed policy 
of favouring peace-loving states against aggressors.  But to institute such a policy on an ad hoc 
basis, clearly directed against a particular side in a particular war, was another matter – and a 
riskier one, as it would inevitably spark hostile feelings in the disfavoured state.  If the United 
States wished to take the Allied side, Jessup contended, it should do so “boldly and frankly” 
by entering into the war, rather than adopting so transparently thin a disguise as a neutral. 
 
                                                 
70  Neutrality Act, Nov. 4, 1939, chap. 2, 54 Stat. 4. 
71  See Philip C. Jessup and Charles Cheney Hyde, “Lifting Arms Ban Now Is Held Unlawful,” N.Y. 
Times, Sep. 21, 1939, at 17, col. 6. 
A further important step was taken in September 1940, when the United States agreed 
to transfer naval destroyers to Britain in exchange for long-term leases of naval and air bases.72  
Even more striking was the lend-lease programme of 1941, which provided for systematic and 
continuing assistance to the Allied side.73  Well before its own entry into the conflict in 
December 1941, the United States was openly functioning as “the arsenal of democracy.” 
 
 This policy of “non-belligerency,” or open favouritism towards the Allied side, was not 
without its critics.  Foremost among them, of course, were the advocates of traditional 
neutrality.  Led by Borchard, they denounced the American policy as amounting to a deliberate, 
systematic, large-scale campaign of international law-breaking.  The concept of “non-
belligerency,” he objected, “has no legal status.  It is apparently designed to justify breaches of 
neutrality or acts of war, perhaps with the hope that they will not result in a state of war.”74  In 
the event, the “non-belligerency” policy was brought to an abrupt end not by a snapping of 
German patience, as in 1917, but instead by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  For the next 
four year, neutrality issues were off of the American agenda. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 It would be pleasing to report the outcome of this vigorous three-way debate over 
neutrality which took place in the inter-war period – i.e., to record either the triumph of one of 
the three or the superseding of all of them by the forward march of history.  That is not possible.  
It cannot be said that any of the three achieved a knock-out blow against the other two, either 
at the hands of United States legislators or World Court judges.  And neither has the debate 
been relegated to history shelves of dusty libraries, to serve as a tasty (if thin) gruel for pedants.  
The issues continue to be alive and in evidence – to those with eyes sufficiently trained to see 
-- to the present day. 
                                                 
72  Great Britain-U.S.A., Leasing of Naval and Air Bases, Sep. 2, 1940, 12 Charles I. Bevins, Treaties and 
Other International Agreements of the United States (Dept of State Pub. 8761, 1974) 551.  
73  Act of Mar. 11, 1941, chap. 11, 55 Stat. 31. 
74  Borchard, “Attorney General’s Opinion,” at 697. 
  In a certain sense, the collective-security perspective may be said to be the predominant 
one today, in that it has been enshrined in the UN Charter.  It is most clearly evident in article 
2(5) of the Charter, which requires UN member states to “refrain from giving assistance to any 
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.”  That is to 
say, that in cases of UN enforcement action, in which an aggressor state has been formally 
identified, neutrality is not an option.  The problem is that there are many cases of armed 
conflict in which the UN has failed to take a definite position.  In such cases, neutrality remains 
possible. 
 
 But is the neutrality in question the traditional or the “new” variety?  The answer is that 
it has been both.  In the Iran-Iraq conflict of 1980-88, a number of countries explicitly declared 
themselves to be neutral – and insisted on respect for their rights as neutrals by the contending 
parties, in ways familiar from past centuries.  But “new neutrality” outlook has been evident 
also, in its signature form of mandatory arms embargoes, which continue to attract criticism 
for impacting on victims as well as on aggressors.  Controversy on this point was especially 
vigorous in the case of the Bosnian civil war of 1992-95. 
 
 It has been noted that the fundamental three-fold division of view on neutrality did not 
arise in the 1930s.  Rather, it emerged in the second half of the Eighteenth Century.  The 
contentions of the 1930s were merely the latest twist in that earlier debate.  Are the rights of 
neutrals (so-called) best seen as merely the residue of the normal rights of states after the 
belligerents have had resort to the principle of necessity?  Or do those rights comprise a more 
or less fixed list, transgression of which is simply unlawful?  Or are those rights merely a relic 
or artifact of a by-gone age of anarchy, which the world is committed to ending?  It is a potent 
– if also sobering – tribute to the three pioneers of the Eighteenth Century that we are still 
struggling with the questions that they raised.  Our present-day struggles may not be so public, 
or so vigorous, or so eloquent as those of the 1930s.  But they are very much with us still. 
